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Tort Law. Palazzolo v. Ruggiano, M.D., 993 F. Supp. 45 (D.R.I.
1998). To bring an action under the Violence Against Women Act,
a plaintiff must state a claim under state law for second-degree
sexual assault to establish the "crime of violence" element required
to support an action under this statute.
In Palazzolo v. Ruggiano,' the United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island found that mere touching does not con-
stitute second-degree sexual assault. Allegations of sexual conduct
without the use of force or coercion cannot establish a "crime of
violence" in which the victim was overcome by an attacker.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff Donna M. Palazzolo (Palazzolo) was a patient of Dr.
John R. Ruggiano (Ruggiano) between the years of 1992 and 1995.2
As her psychiatrist, Ruggiano allegedly made sexually suggestive
physical contact with Palazzolo on three separate counseling ses-
sions. The first occurrence was in the fall of 1994, when Palazzolo
claimed Ruggiano placed his hands around her waist as she was
being weighed.3 In the winter of 1995, Ruggiano allegedly briefly
placed a hand on her shoulder while pressing his genitals against
her buttocks as he weighed her.4 The last incident occurred in
April, 1995, when Ruggiano allegedly placed his arms around her
shoulders and pressed his genital area against hers.5 Palazzolo
testified that she pushed him away and left his office at that time.6
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Count One of Palazzolo's complaint brings a claim under the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The statute provides a civil
cause of action for victims of gender motivated violence. 7 For
VAWA to become applicable, a plaintiff must show that a "crime of
violence" was committed. In doing so, two requirements must be
met: (1) the act must "constitute a felony against the person"; and
1. 993 F. Supp. 45 (D.R.I. 1998).
2. See id. at 48.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) and (b) (1996).
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(2) the act must be a state or federal offense described in 18 U.S.C.
section 16.8
Palazzolo relied upon the Rhode Island second degree sexual
assault statute to demonstrate "felony against the person." Sec-
tion 11-37-4 of the Rhode Island General Laws provides:
A person is guilty of second degree sexual assault if he or she
engages in sexual contact with another person and if any of
the following circumstances exist: (1) The accused knows or
has reason to know that the victim is mentally incapacitated,
mentally disabled or physically helpless. (2) The accused uses
force or coercion. (3) The accused engages in the medical
treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sex-
ual arousal, gratification or stimulation.9
Palazzolo alleged violations of both subsections (2) and (3). 10
In regard to subsection (2) she relied on Rhode Island General
Laws section 11-37-1(2)(B), which is applicable when the assailant
"overcomes the victim through the application of physical force or
physical violence."" That is, it must be clear that contact was
made after a lack of consent by the victim to be sufficient "force or
coercion" under section 11-37-4(2).12 In the first two alleged inci-
dents, the court found no evidence that force or coercion was
used.13 The plaintiff admitted the encounters lasted only a matter
of seconds, and the counseling sessions continued without further
incident. 14 Moreover, Palazzolo admitted that she did not resist or
convey her disapproval in any manner.' 5 In the third incident,
Ruggiano hugged her then she pushed him away.16 He ceased
making any advances and did not restrain her from leaving his of-
fice. Other than the actual sexual conduct, there was no additional
8. 18 U.S.C. section 16 requires that the act either: (a) Have, as an element
of the offense, "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person or property of another"; or (b) "[B]y its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994).
9. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-4 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
10. See Palazzolo, 993 F. Supp. at 48.
11. Id.
12. State v. Goodreau, 560 A.2d 318, 322 (R.I. 1989) (quoting State v.
Carvalho, 409 A.2d 132, 135-36 (1979)).
13. See Palazzolo, 993 F. Supp. at 48,
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
1999l
810 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:605
physical contact. 17 Palazzolo acknowledged that Ruggiano did not
coerce her or use any kind of force when he made contact with
her.18
Although Ruggiano's conduct may have been inappropriate,
the court did not find that such conduct constituted an assault in-
volving force or coercion.' 9 Similarly, the conduct could not be con-
strued to be a "crime of violence" under VAWA. To do so, reasoned
the court, would be to ignore the enumerated criteria set forth
within the statutes, and would also render the term "violent crime"
so overbroad as to include any unwelcome physical contact.20 The
court suggested that the conduct described in Palazzolo's com-
plaint would be better treated under other criminal statutes, such
as battery, or state laws providing civil remedies.2 '
The court also noted that Ruggiano's conduct would satisfy the
section 13981(d)(2)(A) test as a "felony against the person" because
his conduct clearly was "medical treatment or examination ... for
the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or stimulation."22
However, Ruggiano's conduct did not meet the requirements of the
remaining test prongs, and thus could not be held to be a "crime of
violence" under the statute. 23
Since the sole federal claim under VAWA was inappropriate,
the claim was dismissed. The district court had no independent
jurisdictional basis to exercise its jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims, and adhered to the principles of comity by re-
fraining from rendering judgment on the twelve state law-based
claims.24
CONCLUSION
The district court is unwilling to allow a claim to be brought
under VAWA unless the plaintiff can demonstrate a "crime of vio-
lence" has occurred. In doing so, the court avoids a trivialization of
the statute by directing the plaintiff to seek remedies for her
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 48-49.
22. Id. at 49.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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claims under the appropriate governing statutes. Thus the court
upholds the fundamental purposes underlying VAWA by confining
claims brought under the statute to those who have been victim of
a violent, gender-based crime. Accordingly, Ruggiano's motion to
dismiss is granted.
Christopher H. Lordan
